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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The 2002 Farm Bill (PL 107-171) contains a Country-of-Origin Labeling (COOL) 
provision that requires retailers to label the country of origin of any covered commodity.  
The COOL was initially planned to be mandatory from September 30, 2004 but has been 
delayed for two years.  The covered commodities in the COOL provision include whole 
muscle and ground products of beef, lamb, pork, seafood (wild and farm-raised fish and 
shell fish), fresh and frozen fruits, vegetables and peanuts.  Although the implementation 
of this provision is expected to affect U.S. agriculture and food industries as well as trade 
relations with neighboring countries significantly, there is still a great deal of uncertainty 
regarding the COOL effect.  Some producer groups (e.g., R-CALF United Stockgrowers 
of America) expect that the new provision would increase the demand for U.S. beef by 
promoting beef born, raised, and processed in the United States. However, producer 
groups such as National Cattlemen’s Beef Association (NCBA) and National Pork 
Producers Council (NPPC) do not support the mandatory COOL because they expect the 
cost would outweigh the benefit.  Packers and retailers are also concerned about the 
increased labor and infrastructure cost due to the COOL requirements.  A few studies 
have evaluated the effects of COOL in the livestock industry, but most of them have 
failed to address the effects of imperfect competition particularly at packing and retailing 
stages.  
The structure of beef packing industry in the United States has become 
increasingly concentrated within the past decade and there are statistically significant 
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monopoly/monopsony price distortions in slaughter cattle and wholesale beef markets 
(Schroeter, 1988).  Therefore, it is not surprising that non-competitive performance has to 
be taken into account when evaluating the cost effect caused by COOL.  Under this 
condition, the important but still unanswered question is: will COOL benefit U.S. beef 
producers?  And how will the cost of COOL affect each supply level according to the 
beef multi-production system? 
 
Problem Statement 
  
The country-original-labeling (COOL) regulation is not only expected to enhance food 
safety and welfare of domestic consumers, but also expected to increase the producer 
cost.  Opponents of this legislation believe that the cost will harm the producers. 
Supporters argue that when domestic consumers know the original source of foods, they 
may be willing to buy more domestic foods (Plain and Grimes). As a result, benefits will 
offset costs for producers. 
In addition, economic theory suggests that if consumers’ demand for beef and 
pork products is more inelastic, consumers will bear more cost of COOL, while if the 
consumers’ demand for beef and pork products is more elastic, producers will bear more 
cost of COOL.  As a result the impacts of COOL on producers and consumers should 
depend on own and cross price elasticities in the met industry. 
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Objectives 
 
The general objective of this study is to estimate the effects of Country-of-Origin 
Labeling policy in the U.S. meat industry.  The study analyzes factors that affect the 
distribution of COOL cost between producers and consumers with consideration of 
market power and trade.  The specific objectives of this study are tow fold: (1) provide 
theoretical analysis about how domestic producers’ derived demand would change under 
alternative cross price elasticities (cross price elasticities of domestic product demand 
with respect to the price of imported product); COOL cost (increased marketing and 
producer cost) and market power ( market power in both upstream and downstream 
markets); and (2) to examine COOL impact on domestic producers with different COOL 
cost scenarios and cross price elasticities with three-sector equilibrium displacement 
model (EDM) of the U.S. meat market . 
This equilibrium displacement model (EDM) for the U.S. meat industry includes 
substitution relations between domestic and foreign beef, pork, and poultry products 
under imperfectly competitive market conditions at both processing and retailing levels.  
Unlike previous studies, the study examines COOL impact on imperfectly competitive 
meat industry with variable proportions.  
The following chapter summarizes a conceptual framework for the analytical 
model used in this study.  The equilibrium displacement model for the US meat industry 
and its applicability to the identified study problems are reviewed in Chapter III.  Data 
sources, collection methods and empirical models are presented in Chapter IV.  Chapter 
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V discusses empirical findings and implications.  Finally, the last chapter provides 
concluding remarks, limitations of the current study, and suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The literature reviewed for this study can be divided into four areas: COOL cost 
estimation and the premium that consumers are willing to pay for the U.S. origin meat, 
impact of COOL cost on domestic producers and consumers, market power in beef and 
pork industries, and meat trade between US and foreign countries. 
 
COOL Cost Estimation and Consumers’ Willingness-to-Pay Premium 
 
USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service published a Notice (USDA-AMS, 2002) and 
reported their estimation for the COOL cost.  They expected a $1.968 billion for the first 
year’s record-keeping costs.  For this cost, $1 billion is born by producers and $340 
million by food handlers and $627.75 million by retailers. 
Some researchers argue that different assumptions will result in different 
estimated costs.  For example, Van Sickle et al. assume that if all imported products 
except U.S. origin ones are required to be labeled, the cost will be much less than the cost 
estimated by USDA.  According to their assumption, the record keeping cost associated 
with COOL will be between $69.86 million and $193.43 million. Compared to other 
researcher groups, Van Sickle et al. are more optimistic about the COOL impacts.  Van 
Sickle et al. estimate that U.S. consumers will be likely to pay a premium for domestic 
beef up to $3.0 billion.  Therefore, the estimated benefit will offset the expected COOL 
cost. 
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On the other hand, some individuals and groups claim that the USDA’s result 
underestimates the COOL cost.  More pessimistic estimation was reported by Sparks 
Companies, Inc. and Cattle Buyers Weekly.  They assumes that record keeping systems 
will be required throughout the whole supply chain and their results show that COOL will 
contribute to an increase in total cost from $3.66 to $5.60 billion dollars even without 
cost in the lamb and peanut sectors.  Plain and Grimes argue that consumers will not pay 
a premium for beef since most of beef in retail stores are already the U.S. original 
products. 
 
Effect of COOL Cost on Domestic Producers and Consumers 
 
The COOL cost will be borne by producers and consumers.  Lusk and Anderson (2003) 
developed an equilibrium displacement model (EDM) for farm, wholesale, and retail 
markets for beef, pork and poultry.  This EDM can be used to analyze the impact of 
COOL cost on producers and consumers.  Empirical results indicate that when 
consumers’ willingness-to-pay increases by 2% to 3%, the producer welfare lost will be 
offset.  Brester and Marsh (2004) used linear equilibrium model to simulate the short-run 
and long-run changes in equilibrium prices and quantities of livestock products that 
would result from implementing COOL policy.  Their research shows that there will be a 
significantly large increase in consumer demand for beef and pork in the short run; in the 
long run, a 0.45% annual increase in consumer demand for beef and a 0.50% annual 
increase in pork demand. 
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Market Power in the U.S. Meat Industry 
 
The structure of beef packing and retailing in the United States has become increasingly 
concentrated within the past decade.  Applying Appelbaum’s framework (1979), 
Schroeter estimated the degree of oligopolistic and oligopsonistic performance in the 
U.S. beef packing market (1988).  The results confirmed the presence of small price 
distortions. 
Many studies have typically assumed an integrated processing/retailing sector so 
that upstream and downstream market power of the integrated sector can be conveniently 
derived from processor’s profit maximization problem (e.g., Azzam; Alston, Sexton, and 
Zhang; and Kinnucan).  However this type of modeling does not take into account of the 
effect of market power in retailing.  Several studies found that the observed food price 
depends on the relative degree of market power of processors and retailers (e.g., Binkley 
and Connor; Richards et al.).  We improved previous studies by allowing retailer’s 
oligopsony power to separate from processor’s market power.  To account for the effect 
of market power at the retail sector, profit maximization conditions for three sectors 
(retailing, processing, and farm) are simultaneously solved and the equilibrium conditions 
are incorporated in a multi-equation model. 
Based on Azzam (1998) and Holloway (1991)’s work, Kinnucan (2003) extended 
Muth’s (1965) model and analyzed the impact of food industry market power on farmers’ 
incentive to promote the products.  Applying the model to the US beef industry, he found 
that for plausible parameter values market power reduces farmers’ incentives to promote 
the products. 
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Based on above studies, market power should not be neglect when examine 
impact of COOL in the U.S. meat industry. 
 
Trade between Domestic and Foreign Products 
 
The United States mainly import lightweight feeder cattle from Mexico, trimmings and 
ground beef from Australia and New Zealand, and a mix of high-value muscle cuts, 
manufacturing/trimming beef, fed cattle, feeder cattle, and fed cattle carcasses from 
Canada.  The USDA reported that U.S. imported around 28% of its beef consumption in 
2002.  In 2002 the United States imported approximately 1.1 billion pounds of pork, 
which represented about 5.2% of total U.S. pork supplies.  Over 80% of those imports 
originated in Canada.   
 United States only imports small amount of broilers because U.S. has the largest 
producers and exporters of poultry in the world.  The domestic consumption for poultry is 
higher than that for beef or pork but less than the total red meat consumption.  Since 
imported beef and pork consumption is relatively large, this study will include them as 
substitute products for domestic meat, but the poultry import will be neglected in the 
EDM. 
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CHAPTER III 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This study considers the production of beef, pork and poultry meats from the perspective 
of three stages: producing, processing and retailing.  At the production level, animals are 
bred into certain weight, sold to processors to be slaughtered and processed.  Then the 
final products are sold to retailers such as major supermarket chains. 
As Figure 1 shows, fed cattle, trimmings, ground beef/pork and other meat 
products can be imported from foreign countries at processing and retail levels.  COOL 
will has effects on the consumption structure of the U.S. meat market, especially on the 
consumption tendency between domestic and foreign meats.  Before COOL, consumers 
could not differentiate meats from different origins and as a result, meat prices did not 
change by the country of origin.  But after COOL, consumer can differentiate domestic 
goods from foreign goods.  Then, the price of domestic and foreign goods may be 
different and may move separately like different kinds of products.  So this study 
includes the substitute relationships between domestic and foreign meat. 
This study also assumes variable input substitution between farm level input and 
market input; processors have oligopsony power over farmers while retailers have 
oligopoly market power over consumers.  
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Figure 1.  Meat Import by the United State
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Once COOL is implemented, the cost increase will affect the action of all 
participants in meat supply sectors as well as the response of consumers.  COOL causes 
an increase in price at farm, packing and retail levels.  After we set up the equilibrium 
displacement model, we take COOL cost as exogenous supply shifters in different sectors 
to examine the response of each production level.  The supply curve will shift upward 
because of the COOL cost, and the demand curve for domestic meat will shift right if 
consumers would like to buy more domestic origin meats.  
The COOL effect at retail the level is illustrated in Figure 2. 
  
Figure 2.  Effects of Imposing COOL Costs on the Retail Level 
 
Here P0 is the original price of meat.  Q0 is the original consumption quantity of meat.  S 
is the supply curve without cost.  S’ is the supply curve with cost increase.  D is the 
demand curve before COOL.  D’ is the demand curve after COOL. 
 12
This study assumes that no other demand and supply factors are affected due to 
COOL other than the price and quantity.  We use the equilibrium displacement model to 
calculate relative changes in price and quantity in response to COOL-induced supply and 
demand shifters. 
 
Hypotheses 
 
Four hypotheses to be tested in this study include: 
(1) The cost of COOL will make domestic producers worse off if there is no demand 
increase; meanwhile, poultry industry will be better off since consumers will buy 
more poultry as a substitute of beef and pork. 
(2) The cost of COOL would outweigh the overall industry benefit unless COOL 
leads to less cost increase and an increase in consumers’ willingness-to-pay.     
(3) The more elastic the own price elasticity of domestic beef and pork, the more 
COOL cost domestic producers will bear. 
(4) The producers would be better off if consumers choose to buy more domestic 
origin product and/or cross price elasticities to foreign products get more elastic. 
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CHAPTER IV 
PROCEDURES AND DATA SOURCES 
 
The study develops a Muth-type equilibrium displacement model that is able to estimate 
the impact of COOL on meat production system and its trade relations.   The model 
includes equilibrium conditions of each production stage with consideration of trade and 
market structure.  A unique feature of this model is that it allows retailer’s oligopsony 
power to separate from processor’s market power.  As stated earlier, a model 
disaggregated along vertical directions is set up in order to study the COOL costs in 
different sectors.  After the COOL implement, consumers can distinguish domestic beef 
from imported beef.  As the price of these two kinds of beef should be different, we treat 
them as two different commodities in this study.   
First we set up the demand and supply functions for each stage of production 
system (foreign-origin beef and pork, domestic-origin beef and pork, and domestic 
poultry).  To account for market power in processing and retailing sectors, this study 
derives imperfect competitive conjecture variables through firm’s profit maximization 
problem.  We will develop the model by totally differentiating the structural equations 
and using log differentials to convert the original functions to elasticity form.  Then using 
the linear elasticity model, we will calculate relative changes in price and quantity in 
response to COOL-induced supply and demand shifts.  The model is also based on the 
variable proportion technology.   
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The model will be simulated for three different scenarios of cost increases (low, 
medium, and high) and four additional scenarios on consumers’ willingness to pay for 
“U. S.  Origin” beef (no change, 2%, and 5% increase in willingness to pay) under 
alternative demand, supply and substitution elasticities.  The model will also be simulated 
for three different scenarios of market structure (perfectly competitive in all sectors, 
imperfectly competitive in processing sector only, and imperfectly competitive in both 
retailing and processing sectors).  Data for estimation of the cost increase due to COOL 
are obtained from USDA publications, journal articles, and unpublished reports from 
consulting companies.  Demand, supply and substitution elasticites for the U.S. beef 
industry are collected from previous studies. 
 
Basic Formulation of the Mathematical Structure Model 
 
First, the model comprises horizontally linked domestic beef, foreign beef, domestic 
pork, foreign pork, domestic poultry with the vertical linkage of farm, wholesale, and 
retail sectors.  Second, this model permits variable proportions by incorporating the 
elasticity of substitution between farm and marketing inputs.  Third, market power is 
included in this model.  Finally, each industry combines a farm-based input FQ  with a 
bundle of marketing inputs MQ  to produce retail beef RQ  under conditions of constant 
returns to scale (CRTS).   
Processors take the price of marketing services MP  as given, but they have 
sufficient market presence to influence the price of the farm-based input FP , and the 
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price of the retail beef RBP .  That is, downstream processors/retailers exercise oligopoly 
power in the retail beef market and oligopsony power in the cattle market, but are 
individually too small in relation to the total food economy to influence market input 
price MP .  Consumer demand for domestic beef is separated from foreign beef sold at 
domestic market. That is because as COOL policy issues, consumer can distinguish 
domestic beef from foreign beef, so these two different original beef can be regarded as 
different goods in the retail market and the prices will not move together.  After COOL 
policy issues, the farmer and marketers will bear a cost increase.   
Under these assumptions a structural model is represented by: 
 Retail (Demand) 
Beef  
(4. 1) R
BDQ =
R
BDQ (
R
BDP ,
R
PDP ,
R
CP ,
R
BFP ,
R
PFP ) 
(4. 2) R
BFQ =
R
BFQ  (
R
BDP ,
R
PDP ,
R
CP ,
R
BFP ,
R
PFP ) 
Pork  
(4. 3) R
PDQ =
R
PDQ  (
R
BDP ,
R
PDP ,
R
CP ,
R
BFP ,
R
PFP ) 
(4. 4) R
PFQ =
R
PFQ  (
R
BDP ,
R
PDP ,
R
CP ,
R
BFP ,
R
PFP ) 
Poultry  
(4. 5) R
CQ =
R
BDQ (
R
BDP ,
R
PDP ,
R
CP ,
R
BFP ,
R
PFP ) 
 Retail (Supply) 
Beef  
(4. 6) R
BDQ =
Bf  ( FBDQ ,
M
BDQ ) 
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(4. 7) R
BFQ =
Bg  ( FBFQ ,
M
BFQ ) 
Pork  
(4. 8) R
PDQ =
Pf  ( FPDQ ,
M
PDQ ) 
(4. 9) R
PFQ =
Pg  ( FPFQ ,
M
PFQ ) 
Poultry  
(4. 10) R
CQ =
Cf  ( FCQ ,
M
CQ ) 
 Farm-level derived demand 
Beef  
(4. 11) F
BDP (1+ BΩ )= RBDP BQFBDf (1+ Bψ ) 
(4. 12) F
BFP (1+ BΩ )= RBFP BQ FBFg  (1+ Bψ ) 
(4. 13) M
BDP =
R
BDP
B
QMBD
f  (1+ Bψ ) 
(4. 14) M
BFP =
R
BFP
B
QMBF
g (1+ Bψ ) 
Pork  
(4. 15) F
PDP (1+ PΩ )= RPDP PQ FPDf (1+ Pψ ) 
(4. 16) F
PFP (1+ PΩ )= RPFP PQ FPFg  (1+ Pψ ) 
(4. 17) M
PDP =
R
PDP
P
QMPD
f  (1+ Pψ ) 
(4. 18) M
PFP =
R
PFP
P
QMPF
g  
Poultry  
(4. 19) F
CP  (1+ CΩ )= RCP CQ FCf  (1+ Cψ ) 
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(4. 20) M
CP =
R
CP
C
QMC
f  (1+ Cψ ) 
 Farm-level supply 
Beef  
(4. 21) F
BDP =
F
BDP  (
F
BDQ , BDμ ) 
(4. 22) F
BFP =
F
BFP  (
F
BFQ , BFμ ) 
Pork  
(4. 23) F
PDP =
F
PDP  (
F
PDQ , PDμ )  
(4. 24) F
PFP =
F
PFP  (
F
PFQ , PFμ ) 
Poultry  
(4. 25) F
CP =
F
CP  (
F
CQ ) 
 Market Input Supply 
(4. 26) ),( B
M
BD
M
BD
M
BD PQQ γ=  
(4. 27) ),( B
M
BF
M
BF
M
BF PQQ γ=  
(4. 28) ),( P
M
PD
M
PD
M
PD PQQ γ=  
(4. 29) ),( PMPFMPFMPF PQQ γ=  
(4. 30) )( MCF
M
CF
M
CF PQQ =  
 
Superscripts R, F, M denote retail, farm, market prices and quantities 
respectively; the subscripts B, P, C denotes beef, pork and poultry respectively; 
subscripts D and F denote domestic and foreign origin separately.  
Equations (4.1) to (4.5) are retail demand for domestic origin and foreign origin 
beef, pork and poultry in the U. S. meat market.  In this model domestic origin beef, pork, 
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and poultry, and foreign origin beef and pork are substitute goods.  This model does not 
consider poultry import issue; instead, it only includes domestic poultry demand and 
supply.  RBDQ , 
R
BFQ , 
R
PDQ , 
R
PFQ , and 
R
BFQ  are retail demand; 
R
BDP ,
R
BFP ,
R
PDP , 
R
PFP  and 
R
CP are retail prices for domestic and foreign origin beef, pork and poultry.   
Equations (4.6) to (4.10) are supply functions.  The industry combines farm-based 
inputs FijQ ( i =beef, pork, poultry; j =domestic, foreign) with a bundle of marketing 
inputs MijQ  to produce retail products 
R
ijQ  under conditions of constant returns to scale 
(CRTS).  Equations (4.11) to (4.20) are farm level derived demand functions.  Firms in 
the industry take the price of marketing services MijP as given, but they have sufficient 
market presence to influence the price of the farm-based inputs FijP  and the price of the 
retail products RijP .  That is, downstream firms exercise oligopoly power in the 
R
ijQ  
market and exercise oligopsony power in the FijQ  market.  F
iD
i
i
Q Q
ff F
iD ∂
∂=  ( =i beef, pork, 
poultry) are domestic farm level input quantity FiDQ ’s marginal product function; 
F
iF
i
i
Q Q
gg F
iF ∂
∂=  ( i =beef, pork, poultry) are foreign farm level input quantity FiFQ ’s marginal 
product function.  iψ = 
ij
i
η
ξ
 ( i  = beef, pork, poultry; j =domestic, foreign) are the Lerner 
index that denotes oligopoly power, where ijη  are the retail demand elasticity of 
j original meat i , and iξ  are the output conjectural elasticity ( ]1,0[∈iξ , 0=ξ for 
perfect competition and 1=ξ  for pure monopoly).  ijΩ =
ij
ij
ε
θ
 are the Lerner index to 
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denote oligopsony power in thi  meat market, where ijε  is the supply elasticity for FijQ , 
and  θ  is the input conjectural elasticity ( ]1,0[∈θ , 0=θ  for perfect competition and 
1=θ  for pure monopoly).  
Equations (4.21) to (4.25) are farm level supply functions and (4.26) to (4.30) are 
marketing input supply functions.  ijμ  and ijγ  are COOL caused increasing in cost for 
meat i  of origin j  at farm level and market level respectively.  
The model contains 25 endogenous variables ( RBDQ ,
F
BDQ ,
F
BDP , 
R
BDP ,
R
BFQ ,
F
BFQ ,
F
BFP , 
R
BFP ,
M
BDQ ,
M
BFQ , ,,,
F
PD
F
PD
R
PD PQQ  
R
PDP , 
R
PFQ , 
F
PFQ , 
F
PFP ,
R
PFP , 
M
PDQ , 
M
PFQ , 
R
CQ ,
F
CQ ,
F
CP , 
R
CP ,
M
CQ ), 8 exogenous variables(
M
BDP , 
M
BFP , 
M
PDP , 
M
PFP , 
M
CP , BDμ , BFμ , PDμ , PFμ , BDγ  , 
BFγ , PDγ , PFγ ).  Following the standard assumptions of this type of model (Muth, 1964; 
Gardner, 1975), the parameters are treated as exogenous variables. 
 
The EDM Model 
 
Following Muth (1964), structural equations, (4. 1) - (4. 25), are expressed in percentage 
changes as:  
 Retail (Demand) 
Beef  
(4. 31) E RBDQ = ),( BDBDη (E RBDP - Bδ )+ ),( PDBDη (E RPDP - Pδ )+ ),( CBDη E RCP + ),( BFBDη E RBFP + ),( PFBDη E RPFP  
(4. 32) E RBFQ  = ),( BDBFη (E RBDP - Bδ )+ ),( PDBFη (E RPDP - Pδ )+ ),( CBFη E RCP + ),( BFBFη E RBFP + ),( PFBFη E RPFP  
Pork  
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(4. 33) E RPDQ = ),( BDPDη (E RBDP - Bδ )+ ( , )PD PDη (E RPDP - Pδ )+ ),( CPDη E RCP + ( , )PD BFη E RBFP + ( , )PD PFη E RPFP  
(4. 34) E RPFQ = ),( BDPFη (E RBDP - Bδ )+ ( , )PF PDη (E RPDP - Pδ )+ ),( CPFη E RCP + ( , )PF BFη E RBFP + ( , )PF PFη E RPFP  
Poultry  
(4. 35) E RCQ = ),( BDCη (E RBDP - Bδ )+ ),( PDCη (E RPDP - Pδ )+ ),( CCη E RCP + ( , )C BFη E RBFP + ( , )C PFη E RPFP  
 Retail (Supply) 
Beef  
(4. 36) E RBDQ = Bκ  E FBDQ + )1( Bκ− E MDQ  
(4. 37) E RBFQ = Bκ E FBFQ + )1( Bκ− E MFQ  
Pork  
(4. 38) E RPDQ = Pκ  E FPDQ + )1( Pκ− E MDQ  
(4. 39) E RPFQ = Pκ E FPFQ + )1( Pκ− E MFQ  
Poultry  
(4. 40) E RCQ = Cκ  E FCQ + )1( Cκ− E MDQ  
 Derived Demand for Farm-level Input  
Beef  
(4. 41) 
E FBDP =E
R
BDP -
B
B
σ
κ   -1 E FBDQ +
B
B
σ
κ   -1 E MDQ + ψηB E Bψ - ΩBε E BΩ  
(4. 42) 
E FBFP =E
R
BFP -
B
B
σ
κ   -1 E FBFQ +
B
B
σ
κ   -1 E MFQ + ψηB E Bψ - ΩBε E BΩ  
Pork  
(4. 45) 
E FPDP =E
R
PDP -
P
P
σ
κ   -1 E FPDQ +
P
P
σ
κ   -1 E MDQ + ψηP E Pψ - ΩPε E PΩ  
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(4. 46) 
E FPFP =E
R
PFP -
P
P
σ
κ   -1 E FPFQ +
P
P
σ
κ   -1 E MDQ + ψηP E Pψ - ΩPε E PΩ  
Poultry  
(4. 49) 
E FCP =E
R
CP -
C
C
σ
κ   -1 E FCQ +
C
C
σ
κ   -1 E MDQ + ψηC E Cψ - ΩCε E CΩ  
 Derived Demand for Marketing Input 
Beef  
(4. 43) 
B
B
MD
EEP κ
γ
−+ 1 =E
R
BDP +
B
B
σ
κ  E FBDQ -
B
B
σ
κ  E MDQ + ψηB E Bψ  
(4. 44) 
B
B
MF
EEP κ
γ
−+ 1 =E
R
BFP +
B
B
σ
κ  E FBFQ -
B
B
σ
κ  E MFQ + ψηB E Bψ  
Pork  
(4. 47) 
E MDP +
P
PE
κ
γ
−1 =E
R
PDP +
P
P
σ
κ  E FPDQ -
P
P
σ
κ  E MDQ + ψηP E Pψ  
(4. 48) 
E MFP +
P
PE
κ
γ
−1 =E
R
PFP +
P
P
σ
κ  E FPFQ -
P
P
σ
κ  E MFQ + ψηP  E Pψ  
Poultry  
(4. 50) 
E MDP =E
R
CP +
C
C
σ
κ  E FCQ -
C
C
σ
κ  E MDQ + ψηC E Cψ  
Beef  
(4. 51) E FBDQ =
F
BDε ( FBDEP - BEμ ) 
(4. 52)  E FBFQ = 
F
BFε ( FBDEP - BEμ ) 
Pork  
(4. 53)  E FPDQ =
F
PDε ( FPDEP - PEμ ) 
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(4. 54)  E FPFQ = 
F
PFε  ( FPFEP - PEμ ) 
Poultry  
(4. 55)  E FCQ =
F
Cε FCEP  
 Marketing Input Supply 
(4. 56)  E MBDQ =
M
BDε (
B
BM
BD
E
EP κ
γ
−−1
)  
(4. 57)  )
1
(
B
BM
BF
M
BF
M
BF
EEPEQ κ
γε −−=  
(4. 58)  
E MPDQ =
M
PDε (
P
PM
PD
EEP κ
γ
−− 1 ) 
(4. 59)  
E MPFQ =
M
PFε (
P
PM
PF
EEP κ
γ
−− 1 ) 
(4. 60)  E MCQ =
M
Cε MCEP , 
where ψηB =
B
B
ψ
ψ
+1 , ΩBε = B
B
Ω+
Ω
1
, F BDBD ),(η = F
BD
Q
Q
f F
BD
∂
∂
F
BDQ
F
BD
f
Q .  nijEQ  and 
n
ijEP  are percentage 
changes in quantity and price of the thi meat with thj origin at the nth level, respectively, 
where n
ij
n
ijn
ij
n
ij Q
dQ
QdEQ ≈= ln .  Demand elasticities are represented by ijη .  iS is the 
farmers’ share of the retail dollar for the thi  meat, iσ  is the elasticity of substitution 
between meat i  and marketing inputs, and ijε  is the supply elasticity of thi  meat of thj  
origin.   
Exogenous shocks to the system of equations are given by BEδ , BDEμ  and 
κ
γ
−1
BDE , PEδ , PDEμ  and κ
γ
−1
PDE .  iEδ  represents the percentage change in initial 
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equilibrium price for thi  domestic meat due to an exogenous demand shift (e.g., the 
percentage increase in consumers’ willingness-to-pay for the initial quantity of meat i  
due to the new labeling policy).  Parameters ijEμ  and κ
γ
−1
ijE  represent exogenous shocks, 
expressed in percentage terms, to marketing and farm supply, respectively.  The 
assumptions of the model include: the meat processing and retailing industries are 
characterized by constant returns to scale; the supply curve of marketing inputs is 
perfectly elastic; the products (beef, pork, and poultry) are independent in production 
with no specialized factors in common; and the displacement of supply and demand 
curves are parallel.   
Once parameter values have been assigned, the system of equations can be solved 
using matrix algebra.  The result is an explicit solution for changes in endogenous 
variables, which are percentage changes in price and quantity of beef, pork, and poultry 
at the retail and farm level.  Once these values have been determined, changes in 
producer surplus FiDPSΔ  for thi domestic meat can be calculated is:  
(4. 61)     )5.01)((
** F
iDiD
F
iD
F
iD
F
iD
F
iD EQEEPQPPS +−=Δ μ    poultryporkbeefi ,,=  
Here the asterisks in the superscripts denote the solutions to the system of solved 
equations.   
 Since in domestic retailing market, consumption contains foreign origin meat and 
domestic meat, the consumer surplus change should include changes of both of them.  So 
the consumer surplus iCSΔ  for different meat as:  
(4. 62)  )5.01)(()5.01)((
**** R
iF
R
iF
R
iF
R
iF
R
iD
R
iD
R
iD
R
iDi EQEEPQPEQEEPQPCS +−−+−−=Δ δδ   
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Derived Demand Analysis with Beef Sector Only Model 
 
Because the system equations,  (4. 31) – (4. 60), are too complex to show analytically 
results about  welfare effects of exogenous shocks in detail,, this study considers a simple 
one-sector model of the beef industry for the analysis of derived demand.  Although 
ignoring important issues such as substitutability between meats at the retail level and 
international trade, the simpler model provides better insights about how analytical 
solutions are obtained.  The single sector model for the beef industry is represented by: 
 
Retail Demand 
(4. 63) RBFDFB
R
BDDD
R
BD EPEEPEQ ηδη +−= )(  
(4. 64) RBFFFB
R
BDFD
R
BF EPEEPEQ ηδη +−= )(  
Retail (Supply) 
(4. 65) MBDB
F
BDB
R
BD EQEQEQ )1( κκ −+=  
(4. 66) MBFB
F
BFB
R
BF EQEQEQ )1( κκ −+=  
Farm-level derived demand 
(4. 67) 
BBBB
M
D
B
BF
BD
B
BR
BD
F
BD EEEQEQEPEP Ω−+−+−−= Ωεψησ
κ
σ
κ
ψ
11  
(4. 68) BBBBMF
B
BF
BF
B
BR
BF
F
BF EEEQEQEPEP Ω−+−+−−= Ωεψησ
κ
σ
κ
ψ
11  
Here, ψη = ψ
ψ
+1 , Ωε = Ω+
Ω
1
 
Farm-level supply 
(4. 69) )( B
F
BD
F
D
F
BD EEPEQ με −=  
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(4. 70) )( B
F
BF
F
F
F
BF EEPEQ με −=  
Non Farm-level derived demand 
(4. 71) BBMBD
B
BF
BD
B
BR
BD
B
BM
BD EEQEQEP
E
EP ψησ
κ
σ
κ
κ
γ
ψ+−+=−+ 1  
(4. 72) BBMBF
B
BF
BF
B
BR
BF
B
BM
BF EEQEQEP
EEP ψησ
κ
σ
κ
κ
γ
ψ+−+=−+ 1  
 According to previous assumptions, price of marketing inputs do not change, 
which means both MBDEP  and 
M
BFEP  are equal to zero.   Therefore, equations (4. 53) and (4. 
54) are eliminated while solving the beef only EDM model.   
 In the model, retail demands are downward sloping ( 0,0 << DFDD ηη ); the input 
supply curves are upward-sloping ( 0,0,0,0 >>>> FMFFMDFFFD εεεε ); the COOL cost 
shifts the supply curves to the left (
B
BE
κ
γ
−1 >0, BEμ >0); market power change shifts 
derived demand left ( ψη <0, Ωε >0); and meat industry technology exhibits variable 
proportions ( Bσ >0).  Importantly, the farm-share term 
F
BS (
R
BD
R
BD
F
BD
F
BD
F
BF
F
BD
F
B QPQPSSS /=== ) is evaluated ‘at the initial equilibrium point’, 
thus, the value-share term Bκ  in this model is properly interpreted as a constant. 
Solutions for the above model are determined by using matrix algebra.  
 
Farm level Derived Demand Equation 
The derived ‘demand’ curve for farm output is obtained by dropping Equations (4.43) 
and (4.44) (since we want to treat farm price as temporarily exogenous), and solving the 
remaining equations simultaneously for FBDEQ  yields: 
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(4. 73) 
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Where 
0)1(),( >⋅−+⋅−= σκκηλ BDBD ; 
σκκηλ ⋅−+⋅−= )1(22 ),( BFBF >0; 
σκκηλ ⋅−+⋅−= )1(12 ),( BFBD ; 
σκηκε ⋅+⋅−−= ),(, )1(1 BDBDF MDMDD >0 
σκηκε ⋅+⋅−+= ),(, )1(12 BDBFF MFMFD >0 
σκηκε ⋅+⋅−−= ),(, )1(2 BFBFF MFMFD >0 
),(),(
2)1(12 BFBDBDBFDDD ηηκ ⋅⋅−−⋅= >01 
  Equation (4. 73) can be rewritten as: 
(4. 74) γδ EEEEEPEPEQ BBFBFFBDFBD Μ−Δ+ΩΗ−ΨΓ−Π+Φ−=  
Here 0>Φ , 0>Π , 0>Γ , 0>Η , 0>Δ , 0>Μ .     
Let 
D
Γ=Φ  , here  
                                                 
1 According to Lusk & Anderson, own price elasticities are larger than cross price elastisities, that is 
ijii ηη > , then D>0. 
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here, )( ),(, BDBD
F
MDMDa ησλεσκ ⋅−⋅⋅= , 
)())1(( ),(,),(, BDBD
F
MDMDBFBF
F
MFMFb ησλεηκε ⋅−⋅⋅−−= , and  
( ) ( ) ),(),(,1 BFBDBDBFF MDMDc ηησκεκ ⋅⋅+⋅⋅−= .   
Since the coefficient of FBDEP  is negative, the derived ‘demand’ curve is 
downward sloping, as expected.  The second part of Γ and b, which contains farm level 
supply elasticity F MFMF ,ε  and retail demand ),( BFBFη  in foreign market, reinforces the 
effect of increasing in price of domestic beef because of the substitution relationship.  
The third part of Γ and c, which contains cross price elasticities ),( BFBDη  and ),( BDBFη , 
weakens the effect of b.   
Also, the coefficient of FBFEP  is positive, which means foreign origin beef is a 
substitute of domestic beef in the retail market.  Equation (4.73) also shows that trade 
effect (cross price elasticity) shifts the derived demand up, market power shifts the 
derived demand down, and increased marketing cost shifts the derived demand down.  
Several previous studies (Van Sickle et al.) show that labeling policy will make 
domestic consumers buy more domestic origin meats.  Here we try to analyze how much 
consumer demand would have to increase in order to offset any producer surplus losses 
that would be incurred from COOL.  To determine this value analytically, it is important 
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to note that in Equation (4. 73), changes in producer surplus can be characterized by 
investigating changes in ( μEEP FBF − ).  FBDPSΔ  is set to zero (meaning producers are 
neither benefited nor harmed by COOL), and *δ  is solved as: 
 (4. 75)  *δ = ψησκεκ
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Here, ),(),(),(),( BFBFBDBDBFBDBDBFM ηηηη ⋅−⋅= ; ( ) σκηκλ ⋅−+⋅−= 1),( BDBD ; *δ  is the 
percentage change in price in retail level.  
If market price is exogenous, BMDEP = BMFEP =0, as assumed by Zhang and Sexton 
(2000) and Wohlgenant (1993), Equation. (4.75) reduces to : 
(4. 76) γησηδη
λκηεηηηκηλ ψ
EE
EEEPEPEQ
BDBDBFBDBDBD
BFBDBFBDBDBD
F
BFBFBD
F
BD
F
BD
)(
)()(
),(),(),(
),(),(),(),(
+++−
Ω−+Ψ⋅+++−= Ω  
From the equation (4.76), the coefficient of FBDEP  σκκηλ ⋅−+⋅−= )1(),( BDBD >0, 
domestic beef price increases will cause farm level demand to decrease; the coefficient of 
F
BFEP  κη ),( BFBD >0 means that foreign origin beef is a substitute good and the price 
increase of the foreign beef will cause an increase in domestic beef consumption ; the 
coefficient of COOL cost shifter γE  is )( ),(),( BDBDBFBD ηση ++ , when 
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σηη +> ),(),( BFBDBDBD , COOL cost increase decreases the derived demand in farm level; 
the coefficient of demand shifter δE coefficient is ),( BDBDη− >0, which indicate that 
consumer demand increase will always increase the farm level demand.   
In this case, when there is no substitution between domestic beef and foreign beef, 
that is ),( BFBDη =0, and there are no supply and demand shifter, Equation (4. 73) reduces 
to: 
(4. 77)        Ω−Ψ+−= Ω EEEPEQ BDBDFBDFBD λεηηλ ψ),(  
Which is equivalent to Kinnucan’s expression of derived demand  without considering 
advertising (Kinnucan, 2002, p. 146).  
 
Interpretation of the Coefficients 
The coefficient of FBFEP  in Equation (4. 76) is κη ),( BFBD , which indicates domestic beef 
and foreign beef are substitute goods, In beef market, market power won’t change after 
the issuing of COOL.  Therefore, both ΨE  and ΩE  equal to zero.  Then, change in 
derived demand  is reduced to : 
(4. 78)    γησηδηκηλ EEEPEPEQ BDBDBFBDBDBDFBFBFBDFBDFBD )( ),(),(),(),( +++−+−=  
Here, ),( BDBDη <0, 01
1 >Ψ+
Ω+= Saκ , R
BD
R
BD
F
BD
F
BD
QP
QPSa = , ),( BFBDη >0, σ >0, and 
σκκηλ ⋅−+⋅−= )1(),( BDBD >0.  
To apply the model to the beef, pork, and poultry industries, we need to assign 
values to the model parameters.  Table 1 reports model parameters and sources for the 
parameter values.  The three-sector model outlined in equations (4. 31)-(4. 55) makes use 
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of all the parameters related to beef or pork.  Following Lemieux and Wohlgenant, this 
study sets the foreign elasticities of supply at 10.  
The remaining values needed to implement the model are cost estimates.  In the 
subsequent analysis, we simulate several scenarios under different cost estimates.  These 
scenarios vary by the magnitude of the cost estimate in addition to who bears the cost.  
To determine the potential costs of COOL, we use the estimates reported by VanSickle et 
al. to get a low estimate of COOL costs, and use the estimates reported by Sparks 
Companies, Inc, to get a high estimate of COOL costs.   
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CHAPTER V 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Chapter IV discusses theoretical results about how changes in domestic and foreign 
prices, market power, COOL cost, and retail demand affect the farm level derived 
demand of one sector model.  In Chapter V, we first apply the conceptual framework 
derived in Chapter IV to the U.S. beef industry.  Then, the single sector model derived in 
Chapter IV will be extended to the U.S. meat industry to examine substitution effects 
across beef, pork, and poultry industries.  The three-sector model is simulated with 
alternative scenarios about COOL costs and premium that U.S. consumers are willing to 
pay for the U.S. origin products.  
 
COOL Effects with Beef Sector Only Model 
 
In this chapter, we examine the impact of COOL on the U.S. domestic beef 
producers and consumers under alternative own price elasticities, while assuming cross 
price elasticities (domestic beef demand respect to foreign beef price, ),( BFBDη ; and 
foreign beef demand respect to domestic beef price, ),( BDBFη ) are fixed.  Then the model 
is first simulated with different cross price elasticities where ),( BFBDη  and ),( BDBFη  move 
together.  Finally, the model is simulated for cases where ),( BFBDη  and ),( BDBFη  move 
independently.  
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In this analysis, we consider medium COOL cost increase (3% of current price) 
and no demand change (Lusk, 2004).  We assume 80% of the cost is borne by processors 
and retailers while 20% is borne by producers (Lusk, 2004).  The farm supply elasticity is 
set at ε =0.15 (Wohlgenant, 1993) and the farm cost-share parameter is set to aS =0.472 
(ERS/USDA, 2001).  Other parameter values used for simulation are listed in Table A1.  
Equations (4.61) and (4.62) can be used to calculate producer surplus and consumer 
surplus.  *δ in Equation (4.75) is the magnitude of demand increase that would be 
required to exactly offset the loss in producer surplus due to cost increase. 2 
 
Results with Alternative Own Price Elasticities  
Assuming there are no market power changes (Ψ =0, Ω =0) and no retail demand change 
( δ =0), results of the producer surplus change and consumer surplus change under 
different price elasticities scenarios are shown in Table 1.  In this part we assume that 
cross price elasticities, ),( BFBDη  and ),( BDBFη , are the same and both equal to 0.5.  Other 
parameters used are listed in Table A1. 
According to Table 1, for all scenarios, an increase in COOL cost decreases 
consumer surplus and producer surplus.  When own price elasticity ),( BDBDη  becomes 
more elastic (from –0.45 to –0.98), cost increase is borne more by producers and as a 
result, change in producer surplus declines from –$131.76 million to –$237.04 million, 
while change in consumer surplus increases from -$542.14 million to -$415.64 million.   
We also estimate how much consumers’ demand increase will offset the 
producers’ loss by calculating *δ  using Equation (4.75).  Results in Table 1 show that 
                                                 
2 Equations are derived in Chapter IV. 
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in order to offset the producer loss from COOL cost, consumer demand for beef, *δ , 
needs to increase from 1.20% to 1.30%. 
 
Results with Alternative Cross Price Elasticities  
Table 2 shows how COOL effects change under different cross price elasticities.  In the 
simulation, we use the same condition as Table 1, except that own price elasticity is fixed 
at a medium value -0.78 and ),( BFBDη  and ),( BDBFη  move together. 
 Results show that when cross price elasticities are all equal to zeros, both 
producers and consumers are worse off from COOL policy, and producers lose -$521.88 
million and consumers lose -$247.72 million. As ),( BFBDη  and ),( BDBFη  increase, producers 
will hurt less, but consumers will pay more for the cost increasing from COOL.  When 
cross price elasticities become more elastic and equal to 1, beef producers’ loss decreases 
to -$138.50 million; meanwhile, consumers’ loss increases to -$708.99 million.  These 
results show that when cross price elasticities become more elastic, COOL cost is shifted 
from producers to consumers.  Especially, when cross price elasticities increase to 1.5, 
producers will gain instead of loss from COOL policy.   
When cross price elastiticies are equal to zero, consumer demand needs to 
increase by 2.90% to offset the impact of COOL cost increase on producers; however, 
when ),( BFBDη  is equal to 1, the consumer demand needs to be increased by only 0.8%  
Table 3 shows how COOL affects producers and consumers under different 
),( BDBFη  when ),( BFBDη  is fixed at 0.2.  The result shows that both producers and 
consumers are worse off from COOL under different ),( BDBFη .  When ),( BDBFη  gets more 
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elastic from 0.5 to 2, domestic producers will loss from -$448.73 million to -$445.48 
million and consumers will lose from -$355.56 million to -$339.46 million; the retail 
demand needs to increase from 2.49% to 2.52% to offset the  producer loss.  The more 
elastic of  ),( BDBFη  is, the less producers lose and the more consumers lose, but not 
significantly.  The result indicates that foreign retail demand cross price elasticity respect 
to domestic price has little effect on domestic producers and consumers welfare. 
 
Table 4 shows how COOL affect producers and consumers when ),( BDBFη  equal 
0.2 under different ),( BFBDη .  The result shows that both producers and consumers are 
worse off from COOL when ),( BFBDη  equals from 0.5 to 1.  But when ),( BFBDη  is more 
elastic at 2.0, the increase in cost will be borne more by consumers and producers will not 
be worse off.  When ),( BFBDη  equal 0.5, producers and consumers will lose -$337.76 and -
$468.97 million dollars respectively and retail demand needs to increase by 1.88% to 
offset the producer loss.  When ),( BFBDη  gets more elastic, the cost from COOL will be 
transferred from producers to consumers, and the producer loss and consumer loss will be 
-$152.16 and -$692.53, respectively.  
 
Results with Alternative Market Power Parameters 
In his study of captive beef supplies, Azzam (1998) uses 0.06 as an upper-limit value for 
θ , and seems to prefer a value of 0.03 for this parameter.  Based on Azzam (1998), as 
well as Sexton’s (2000) view that empirical estimates of market power parameters are 
probably understated, we set θ  with three scenarios: 0.0178, 0.03 and 0.05.  As for 
oligopoly power, the empirical literature suggests that oligopoly power ξ  in the beef 
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marketing channel is probably less than oligopsony power θ , especially when successive 
oligopsony is considered (Schroeter et al., 2000).  In this study we assume that ξ ≤ θ , 
and set the scenarios for ξ  from lower value 0.01, medium value 0.0223 to upper value 
0.05, and market power ratio θ  from 0.0178, 0.03 to upper limit 0.05. 
Table 5 to Table 7 indicate that if processors have the oligopoly and oligopsony 
market powers, both producers and consumers will lose from COOL policy.  But when 
market power effects become more significant, the increasing in cost by COOL will be 
borne more by consumers than by producers.   
Table 5 shows the result of the impact of COOL under different market power 
values.  Here, we set the low market power ratios at ξ =0.01 and θ =0.0178, medium 
value at ξ =0.0223 and θ =0.03 and upper value at ξ =0.05 and θ =0.05.   
With lower market power parameters, producers lose -$527.29 million and 
consumers lose -$440.45 million, and then producers pay less than consumers.  But when 
ξ  increases to 0.05, the change of producer surplus is -$557.57 million, a little more than 
that under lower market power condition, and consumers’ loss is as high as -$1507.73 
million, nearly three fold more than producers’ loss.  This means that when processors 
become more imperfectly competitive, the cost increase will hurt consumers more than 
producers.  Retail demand needs to increase from 3.01% to 3.75% to offset the cost 
increase.   
Table 6 and Table 7 show how COOL affects the beef industry under alternative 
oligopoly and oligopsony parameters. In Table 6, when the parameter of oligopsony 
market power θ  is fixed at the medium value 0.03, the impact of COOL under different 
oligopoly market power is presented with changing ξ  from 0.01 to 0.05. 
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Results in Table 6 and Table 7 show that when the extent of market power 
becomes more significant, both producers and consumers will be worse off.  But the 
processors’ oligopsony power over farmers show lager effect than processors’ oligopoly 
power over retailers  
 
 
Impacts of COOL Cost in the U.S. Meat Industry 
 
Now we use three-sector model to consider COOL effect on the U.S meat industry.  First, 
we assume same cross price elasticities ( iFiD ,η = iDiF ,η , i =beef, pork, poultry) for each 
livestock industry.  Since poultry is not required by COOL regulation, only red meats 
(beef and pork) face cost increase by COOL in the simulation.  Then we estimate the 
COOL effect on producers and consumers for each meat product in the U.S meat market 
in different COOL cost scenarios.  Second, we will compare the COOL effect on U.S 
meat producers under different cross price elasticities. 
To apply the model, Equations (4.31) – (4.55), to the U.S. beef, pork, and poultry 
industries, we use parameter values in Table A13.   The COOL effects are examined in 
different elasticity scenarios, and elasticities of supply for foreign-origin meats are set at 
10 following Lemieux and Wohlgenant. 
Statistics reported by VanSickle et al. imply that reoccurring annual costs from 
COOL would range from about $36 million to $132 million (depending upon whether 
producers bear any COOL costs) for the beef sector and $25 million to $32 million for 
the pork sector.  Dividing these values by the revenue figures reported in Table 1 implies 
                                                 
3 The complete set of values is provided in the Table A1 in appendix A  
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that COOL would increase cost by about 0.5% for beef and about 0.25% for pork.  These 
values are taken to represent the lower-bound cost estimates of COOL. 
To obtain an upper bound on COOL cost estimates, we use the statistics reported 
by Sparks Companies, Inc.  Sparks reports that COOL would cost the beef sector 
approximately $1.620 billion and the pork sector approximately $452 million.  Dividing 
these statistics by the revenue figures reported in Table 1 implies that COOL would 
increase costs by about 6.5% for beef and about 3% for pork and COOL costs are borne 
80% by producers and 20% by marketers (processors and retailers).   
Finally, according to USDA/NASS’s estimates, the total farm revenue for beef, 
pork and poultry are $24,394 million, $12,883 million and $15,341 million dollars 
respectively in 2001 to 2002.  This study will use these data to calculate producer surplus. 
 
COOL Effects in the U.S Meat Market  
This study assumes that the cross price elasticities between domestic and foreign 
countries are the same for both beef and pork.  Table 9 presents results of simulations 
under different COOL cost and retail demand change scenarios.  Figures 1 -3, drawn 
from Table 9, illustrate effects of COOL in alternative scenarios of consumers’ 
willingness to pay for the U.S.-origin beef and pork. 
The results show that when there is no demand increase for domestic beef and 
pork, the cost increase due to COOL is expected to decrease producer surplus in the U.S. 
beef and pork industry and increase producer surplus for poultry industry.  Table 9 shows 
that decline in producer surplus in beef industry ranges from -$12.91 million (when cost 
increases are at low end of estimates) to -$152.96 million (when cost increases are at the 
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high end of estimates); decline in producer surplus in pork industry ranges from -$8.10 
million to -$95.61 million and increase in producer surplus in poultry industry ranges 
from $15.18 million to $183.74 million in the U.S. meat market.  In the three cost 
scenarios, producer surplus decline but producer surplus increase in poultry industry 
while cost increases in beef and pork industry.  The more increase in cost, the more loss 
for beef and pork producers and the more gain for poultry producers. 
If consumers prefer domestic to foreign beef and pork, retail demand increases are 
expected for domestic beef and pork.  Therefore, the model is simulated with several 
scenarios about demand increase in domestic beef and pork.  Here demand increase is 
assumed as 2% and 5%.    
Table 10 reports the producer surplus of the U.S. meat producers in different 
COOL cost scenarios when there is a 2% retail demand increase for domestic beef and 
pork.  Unlike Table 9, Table 10 shows that a 2% retail demand increase results in gain for 
beef and pork producers even at the high cost increase from COOL.  The pork producers 
gain from around $395.71 million to $228.89 million dollars under low to high COOL 
cost increase, and this gain is higher than beef producers’ gain ($222.84 million to $81.85 
million dollars).  Poultry producers are worse off when increase in cost is low and 
medium.  When the COOL cost is high, poultry producers’ surplus increases.  The trend 
of change in producer surplus is the same as Table 9.  When the cost increases, beef and 
pork producer surplus decreases while poultry producer surplus increases.  
When the demand increases by 5% for domestic beef and pork in the U.S market, 
the overall trend of change in producer surplus is the same as the result with a 2% 
demand increase.  The difference is that the beef and pork producers will gain more in 
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each scenario while poultry producers will lose more in the low and medium COOL cost 
scenario and gain less under the high COOL cost scenario.  
 As Table 11 shows, beef producers will gain from $579.44 million dollars to 
$437.03 million dollars, pork producers gain a little less than beef producers in each cost 
scenario.  Poultry producers will loss from -$167.87 million dollars to -$115.95 million 
dollars when cost increases from COOL are low and medium. When cost increase is high, 
poultry producers gain only $2.08 million dollars.  
From Table 10 and Table 11,  it can be concluded that if consumers prefer 
domestic beef and pork by paying higher premium to domestic beef and pork, domestic 
producers of beef and pork will benefit after COOL regulation, while domestic poultry 
producers will be worse off unless the cost increase as high as around 6.5%. 
 
COOL Effects with Different Cross Price Elasticities 
Previous results were obtained under the assumption that cross price elasticities of 
foreign product with respect to price of domestic meat, ),( iDiFη  (i=beef, pork) are inelastic 
at 0.2.  But what would happen if consumers are price elastic in consumption of foreign 
product in response to change in domestic price (or elasticity of domestic demand is 
elastic in response to change in price of foreign product), for example, at 0.6. The 
following discussion compares the COOL effect in alternative scenarios about price 
elasticities of foreign product with respect to price of domestic meat.   
Table 12 shows when there is no demand change, which means δ  is zero, how 
COOL affects the U.S. meat industry under different cross price elasticities. For the 
scenario of inelastic cross price elasticity, we set ),( iFiDη  and ),( iDiFη  as the same and 
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equal to 0.20; own price elasticities ),( BDBDη  and ),( PDPDη  are -0.56 and -0.69, 
respectively.  For the scenario of elastic cross price elasticity, we set ),( iFiDη  and ),( iDiFη  
are the same and equal to 0.60, own price elasticities ),( BDBDη  and ),( PDPDη  are -0.56 and -
0.45, respectively.   The results illustrate the COOL effects under inelastic and elastic 
cross price elasticities, respectively.  Both of these two simulations were performed under 
the assumption of no demand change.   
 Table 12 shows that when there are no demand changes and if consumers are 
more sensitive to the price of foreign meat, the U.S beef and pork producers will lose less 
and poultry producers will gain more in each COOL cost scenarios.  This result is 
consistent with the results in one-sector model. 
Under the high cost scenario, beef producers lose  by $26.58 and pork producers 
lose $11.44 million when 60.0),(),( == iDiFiFiD ηη .  This is compared to beef and pork 
producer loss at$152.96 and $95.61 million when 20.0),(),( == iDiFiFiD ηη respectively.  
The result indicates that if consumers are more sensitive to the foreign product price, the 
loss from COOL will be much less than the case with inelastic cross price elasticities.  
Lusk and Anderson’s results are estimated with inelastic cross price elasticities 
( 20.0),(),( == iDiFiFiD ηη ) only, which indicates that if both cross price elasticities ( ),( iFiDη  
and ),( iDiFη  ) are  larger than 0.2, their results may  overestimate the loss from the COOL 
regulation . 
Next, the three-sector model is simulated with the assumptions of demand 
increase  Table 13 shows if there is a 5% retail demand increase, how COOL would 
affect the U.S. meat market under different cross elasticites ( ),( iFiDη  and ),( iDiFη ).   
 41
Inelastic condition represents results with inelastic conditions, 
20.0),(),( == iDiFiFiD ηη , while  elastic condition shows results from 
60.0),(),( == iDiFiFiD ηη .  Both simulations assume a 5% demand increase for domestic 
beef and pork.  The result in Table 13 shows that when there is a 5% demand increase for 
domestic beef and pork, producers in these two sectors will be better off.  This result is 
consistent with the results in one-sector model. Table 13 shows that under inelastic 
condition, beef producers gain $940.98 million to $719.64 million and pork producers 
gain $870.81 million to $613.98 million, which are higher than gains ranging from 
$579.44 to $437.03 million and from $537.33 to $448.35 million under elastic condition.  
This means that when cross price elasticites get more elastic, the producers will gain 
more than the cases with inelastic cross price elasticities. This conclusion is consistent 
with the result shown in Table 12.  
Results from Table 12 and Table 13 indicate that the cross price elasticites have 
important effect on the estimated results of the COOL effects.  The more elastic of the 
cross price elasticiities, the less beef and pork producers will lose due to COOL when 
there is no demand increase, and they will gain more if there are a 5% demand increase. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study uses an equilibrium displacement model to examine impacts of COOL cost 
increase on producer and consumer welfare in the U.S. meat industry.  The model 
includes substitution relationships not only between different meats such as beef, pork 
and poultry, but also between domestic and foreign original products.  Unlike previous 
studies, this paper considers imperfectly competitive market structure in the meat 
processing industry.  In order to give a detailed view of the COOL effects on the meat 
industry, a single sector model was employed to give a theoretical analysis about how 
COOL affect on the derived demand of domestic farm level producers.  Then, empirical 
simulation results are presented.  The study results indicate that farm level producers for 
beef and pork will be worse off unless consumer demand increases for the U.S. “COOL” 
product when there is no demand increase for domestic beef and pork.  Poultry industry 
will benefit from COOL because consumers will substitute higher-priced beef and pork 
for poultry. When own price elasticity becomes more elastic, producers are expected to 
lose more while consumers will lose less.   When cross price elasticities between 
domestic and foreign products are more inelastic, producers will lose less while 
consumers will lose more.  
The results also show that if processors have the oligopoly and oligopsony market 
powers, both producers and consumers are likely to lose from COOL.  But when the 
extent of market powers becomes more significant, the COOL cost will be borne more by 
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consumers than by producers. However, market power effects seemes to be weak due to 
the offsetting effects from more inelastic derived demand and inward shifting of derived 
demand. 
If COOL can make U.S. consumers more loyal to the U.S. “COOL” products, 
own elasticity more inelastic and cross price elasticity more elastic, it may enhance 
producer benefit substantially.  According to the simulation results, a 2% demand 
increase for domestic beef and pork will offset the potential producer loss from the 
COOL cost. And if domestic demand increases by 5% for beef and pork, farm level 
producers of beef and pork will benefit from COOL significantly.  
This study used a three-sector model to examine the COOL effects on the U.S 
meat industry.  First, assuming same cross price elasticities between domestic and foreign 
market this study estimated the change in producer surplus due to the COOL regulation. 
Second, the COOL effect was compared on U.S meat producers under different cross 
price elasticities. 
The results show that when there is no demand increase for domestic beef and 
pork, the effect of cost increase due to COOL has negative impacts on producer surplus 
in domestic beef and pork industries but positive impacts on the poultry industry.  In 
alternative scenarios of low, medium and high COOL cost increase, producer surplus 
declines as the cost increases in beef and pork industries, but increases in the poultry 
industry.   The more cost increase, the more loss for beef and pork producers and more 
gain for poultry producers.  If consumers are more sensitive to the price of foreign meat, 
the U.S. beef and pork producers will lose less and poultry producers will gain more in 
each COOL cost scenarios when there are no demand changes.   
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This study also found that the more elastic the cross price demand elasticiities 
between domestic and foreign meat, the less beef and pork producers will lose from the 
COOL regulation when there is no demand increase.  Obviously, beef and pork producers 
will gain more when there is a 5% demand increase. 
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Table 1.  COOL Effects with Different Own Price Elasticitya  
 Scenarios 
),( BDBDη  -0.45 -0.78 -0.98 
    
PSΔ (million dollars) -131.76 -203.64 -237.04 
CSΔ  (million dollars) -542.14 -455.77 -415.64 
*δ  1.20% 1.28% 1.30% 
    
a Computed using Equations (4.63) - (4.72), ),( BFBFη = ),( BDBDη  and ),( BFBDη = ),( BDBFη =0.50 
and other values of parameters are in Table A1 in appendix A.  
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Table 2.  COOL Effects with Different Cross Price Elasticities 
 Scenarios 
),( BFBDη  0 0.2 1 1.5 
     
PSΔ (million dollars) -521.88 -448.41 -138.50 80.78 
CSΔ  (million dollars) -247.72 -335.94 -708.99 -973.83 
*δ  2.90% 2.50% 0.80%  
     
Results are calculated with conditions in Table 1 except ),( BFBDη  and ),( BDBFη  while 
holding ),( BDBDη  = -0.78 and ),( BFBDη  = ),( BDBFη .
 47
Table 3.  COOL Effects with Different Cross Price Elasticity  
 Scenarios 
 
),( BDBFη =0.5 ),( BDBFη =0.75 ),( BDBFη =1 ),( BDBFη =2 
     
PSΔ (million dollars) -448.73 -447.52 -447.11 -445.48 
CSΔ  (million dollars) -355.56 -337.01 -337.50 -339.46 
*δ  2.49% 2.50% 2.50% 2.52% 
     
Results are calculated with conditions in Table 1 except ),( BDBFη  while holding 
),( BFBDη =0.2, ),( BDBDη = ),( BFBFη -0.78 
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Table 4.  COOL Effects with Different Cross Price Elasticity  
 Scenarios 
 
),( BFBDη =0.5 ),( BFBDη =0.75 ),( BFBDη =1 ),( BFBDη =2 
     
PSΔ  
(million dollars) 
-337.76 -245.14 -152.16 223.58 
CSΔ  
 (million dollars) 
-468.97 -580.46 -692.53 -1146.67 
*δ  1.88% 1.37% 0.85%  
     
Results are calculated with conditions in Table 1 except ),( BFBDη  while holding  
),( BDBFη  = 0.2, ),( BDBDη  = ),( BFBFη  = -0.78. 
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Table 5.  COOL Effect with Different Market Power 
 Scenarios 
 ξ =0.01,θ =0.0178 ξ =0.0223,θ =0.03 ξ =0.05,θ =0.05 
    
PSΔ  
(million dollars) -530.21 -533.29 -548.60 
CSΔ  
 (million dollars) 
-544.15 -653.44 -1193.09 
*δ  3.07% 3.14% 3.50% 
    
Results are calculated with conditions in the foot note of Table 1 except θ  and ξ . 
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Table 6.  COOL Effect with Different Upstream Oligopoly Power 
 Scenarios 
 ξ =0.01 ξ =0.0223 ξ =0.05 
    
PSΔ  
(million dollars) -530.21 -533.29 -548.60 
CSΔ  
 (million dollars) 
-544.15 -653.44 -1193.09 
*δ  3.07% 3.14% 3.50% 
    
Results are calculated with conditions in foot note of Table 5 except θ  and ξ . 
),( BFBFη  = ),( BDBDη  = -0.78, ),( BFBDη  = ),( BDBFη  = 0 and holding θ  = 0.03. 
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Table 7.  COOL Effect with Different Downstream Oligoposony Power 
 Scenarios 
 θ =0.0178 θ =0.03 θ =0.05 
    
PSΔ  
(million dollars) 
-529.82 -533.29 -538.73 
CSΔ  
 (million dollars) 
-530.33 -653.44 -845.75 
*δ  3.06% 3.14% 3.26% 
    
Results are calculated with conditions in foot note of Table 5 except θ  while holding 
ξ =0.223. 
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Table 8.  COOL Effect with Different Decoposition of Aggregate Price Elasticity 
 Scenarios 
 20.0
56.0
),(),(
),(),(
==
−==
BDBFBFBD
BFBFBDBD
ηη
ηη
 
224.1216.0
774.1776.0
),(),(
),(),(
==
−=−=
BDBFBFBD
BFBFBDBD
ηη
ηη
 
  
PSΔ  
(million dollars) 
        -305.24               -335.56 
CSΔ  
 (million dollars) 
        -653.71               -617.73 
*δ          2.17%                 2.23% 
   
Results are calculated with conditions in the foot note of Table 5 except ),( BDBDη , ),( BFBFη  
and Bκ =0.35.
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Table 9.  COOL Effect on the Meat Industry with No Demand Change 
 Scenarios 
 Beef Pork Poultry 
 PSΔ  CSΔ  PSΔ  CSΔ  PSΔ  CSΔ  
Low Cost Estimate -12.91 -74.28 -15.34 -72.68 24.14 -25.24 
Medium Cost Estimate -65.14 -338.84 -50.57 -396.68 105.91 -110.71 
High Cost Estimate -152.96 -900.26 -181.04 -872.24 291.74 -304.88 
Computed using Equations (4.31) - (4.55) with value of parameters in Table A1 with 0== PB δδ . 
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Table 10.  COOL Effect on the Meat Industry  with 2% Demand Increase 
 Scenarios 
 Beef Pork Poultry 
 PSΔ  CSΔ  PSΔ  CSΔ  PSΔ  CSΔ  
Low Cost Estimate 222.84 702.83 395.71 718.48 -91.70 95.88 
Medium Cost Estimate 170.26 436.75 360.24 493.39 -9.63 10.06 
High Cost Estimate 81.85 -127.78 228.89 -85.26 176.95 -184.96 
Computed using Equations (4.31) -  (4.55) with value of parameters in Table A1 with %2== PB δδ . 
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Table 11.  COOL Effect on the Meat Industry with 5% Demand Increases 
 Scenarios 
 Beef Pork Poultry 
 PSΔ  CSΔ  PSΔ  CSΔ  PSΔ  CSΔ  
Low Cost Estimate 579.44 1878.54 537.33 1715.79 -167.87 279.18 
Medium Cost Estimate 526.34 1610.16 518.42 1589.06 -115.95 192.83 
High Cost Estimate 437.03 1040.99 448.35 985.79 2.08 -3.47 
Computed using Equations (4.31) - (4.55) with value of parameters in Table A1 with %5== PB δδ . 
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Table 12.  COOL Effects with Different Cross Price Elasticities and No Demand Change 
  Scenarios 
 Cross price elasticities Beef Pork Poultry 
  PSΔ  PSΔ  PSΔ  
Low Cost Estimate Inelastic -12.91 -15.34 24.14 
 Elastic  -5.43 -0.13 27.70 
Medium Cost Estimate Inelastic -65.14 -50.57 105.91 
 Elastic  -19.86 -1.16 79.37 
High Cost Estimate Inelastic -152.96 -181.04 291.74 
 Elastic  -26.58 -11.44 166.48 
1) Computed using Equations (4.31) -  (4.55) with same value of parameters in Table A1. 
2)  0== PB δδ . 
3) When cross price is inelastic, ),( BFBDη = ),( BDBFη =0.2; other wise ),( BFBDη  = ),( BDBFη  = 0.6. 
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Table 13.  COOL Effects with Different Cross Price Elasticities and 5% Demand Increase 
  Scenarios 
 Cross price elasticities PSΔ  PSΔ  PSΔ  
  Beef Pork Poultry 
Low Cost Estimate Inelastic 579.44 537.33 -167.87 
 Elastic  940.98 870.81 -59.29 
Medium Cost Estimate Inelastic 526.34 518.42 -115.95 
 Elastic  882.83 735.28 -61.85 
High Cost Estimate Inelastic 437.03 448.35 2.08 
 Elastic  718.64 613.98 494.02 
Computed using Equations (4.31) -  (4.55) with conditions in Table 12 except %5== PB δδ . 
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Figure 3.  COOL effects with no demand change for domestic beef and pork  
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Figure 4.  COOL effects with 2% demand change for domestic beef and pork  
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Figure 5.  COOL effects with 5% demand increases for domestic beef and pork 
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Figure 6.  COOL effects with low cross price elasticities and no demand change 
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Figure 7.  COOL effects with high cross price elasticities and no demand change 
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Figure 8.  COOL effects with low cross price elasticities and 5% demand increase   
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Figure 9.  COOL effects with high cross price elasticities and 5% demand increase  
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APPENDIX A-DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES IN THE MODEL 
 
 
Table A1.  Description of the Parameters in the Models 
 
 
 
Parameter Definition Value 
R
BDBD ),(η  Retail level own-price demand elasticity for domestic beef  -0.56 
R
PDBD ),(η  Retail level cross-price demand elasticity for domestic beef with respect to domestic pork  0.10 
R
CBD ),(η  Retail level cross-price demand elasticity for domestic beef with respect to poultry  0.05 
R
BFBD ),(η  Retail level cross-price demand elasticity for domestic beef with respect to foreign beef  0.20 
R
PFBD ),(η  Retail level cross-price demand elasticity for domestic beef with respect to foreign pork 0.05 
R
BDBF ),(η  Retail level cross-price demand elasticity for foreign beef with respect to domestic beef 0.20 
R
PDBF ),(η  Retail level cross-price demand elasticity for foreign beef with respect to domestic pork  0.05 
R
CBF ),(η  Retail level cross-price demand elasticity for foreign beef with respect to poultry  0.05 
R
BFBF ),(η  Retail level own-price demand elasticity for foreign beef  -0.56 
R
PFBF ),(η  Retail level cross-price demand elasticity for foreign beef with respect to foreign pork 0.10 
R
BDPD ),(η  Retail level cross-price demand elasticity for domestic beef with respect to domestic beef 0.10 
R
PDPD ),(η  Retail level own-price demand elasticity for domestic pork  -0.69 
R
CPD ),(η  Retail level cross-price demand elasticity for domestic pork with respect to poultry  0.04 
R
BFPD ),(η  Retail level cross-price demand elasticity for domestic pork with respect to foreign beef  0.10 
R
PFPD ),(η  Retail level cross-price demand elasticity for domestic pork with respect to foreign pork 0.20 
R
BDPF ),(η  Retail level cross-price demand elasticity for foreign pork with respect to domestic beef 0.10 
R
PDPF ),(η  Retail level cross-price demand elasticity for foreign pork with respect to domestic pork  0.20 
R
CPF ),(η  Retail level cross-price demand elasticity for foreign pork with respect to poultry  0.04 
R
BFPF ),(η  Retail level cross-price demand elasticity for foreign pork with respect to foreign beef 0.23 
R
PFPF ),(η  Retail level own-price demand elasticity for foreign pork -0.69 
R
BDC ),(η  Retail level cross-price demand elasticity for poultry respect to domestic beef 0.21 
R
PDC ),(η  Retail level cross-price demand elasticity for poultry with respect to domestic pork  0.07 
R
CC ),(η  Retail level own-price demand elasticity for poultry  -0.33 
R
BFC ),(η  Retail level cross-price demand elasticity for poultry with respect to foreign beef  0.21 
R
PFC ),(η  Retail level cross-price demand elasticity for poultry with respect to foreign pork 0.07 
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R
BDBD,ε  Retail level own-price derived supply elasticity for domestic beef 0.15 
R
BFBF ,ε  Retail level own-price derived supply elasticity for foreign beef 10.00 
R
PDPD,ε  Retail level own-price derived supply elasticity for domestic pork 0.40 
R
PFPF ,ε  Retail level own-price derived supply elasticity for foreign pork 10.00 
R
CC ,ε  Retail level own-price derived supply elasticity for domestic poultry 0.65 
BDσ  Elasticity of substitution between domestic beef and marketing inputs 0.72 
BFσ  Elasticity of substitution between foreign beef and marketing inputs 0.72 
PDσ  Elasticity of substitution between domestic pork and marketing inputs 0.35 
PFσ  Elasticity of substitution between foreign beef and marketing inputs 0.35 
Cσ  Elasticity of substitution between domestic poultry and marketing inputs 0.11 
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APPENDIX B-MAPLE CODE FOR SIMULATING MODEL 
 
Beef  Sector Model Maple Program Code  
> Restart; 
> With(linalg); 
> cool_cost_share:=0.2; 
> Epsi:=0;Eomiga:=0;Egamma:=(1-cool_cost_share)*Cost*(1-kappa);Emu:=cool_cost_share*Cost; 
 
> Eq := {                                                                                                                                                                                              
-EQ_R_BD+(eta11*(EP_R_BD-Edelta)+eta12*EP_R_BF),                                                                                                    
-EQ_R_BF+(eta21*(EP_R_BD-Edelta)+eta22*EP_R_BF),                                                                                                       
-EQ_R_BD+0.57*EQ_F_BD+(1-kappa)*EQ_MD,                                                                                                                  
-EQ_R_BF+kappa*EQ_F_BF+(1-kappa)*EQ_MF,                                                                                                                
-EP_F_BD+(EP_R_BD-((1-kappa)/sigma)*EQ_F_BD+((1-kappa)/sigma)*EQ_MD+eta1*Epsi-epsilon1*Eomiga),                                        
-EP_F_BF+(EP_R_BF-((1-kappa)/sigma)*EQ_F_BF+((1-kappa)/sigma)*EQ_MF+eta1*Epsi-epsilon1*Eomiga),              
-Egamma/(1-kappa)+EP_R_BD+(kappa/sigma)*EQ_F_BD-(kappa/sigma)*EQ_MD+eta1*Epsi, -Egamma/(1-   
kappa)+EP_R_BF+(kappa/sigma)*EQ_F_BF-(kappa/sigma)*EQ_MF+eta1*Epsi,                                                                                             
-EQ_F_BD+epsilon11*(EP_F_BD-Emu),                                                                                                                              
-EQ_F_BF+epsilon12*(EP_F_BF-Emu)           }; 
 
>A_1:=genmatrix(Eq,[EQ_R_BD,EQ_R_BF,EP_F_BD,EP_F_BF,EP_R_BD,EP_R_BF,EQ_F_BD,EQ_MD,EQ_F_BF
,EQ_MF]); 
>B:=matrix(10,1,[EQ_R_BD,EQ_R_BF,EP_F_BD,EP_F_BF,EP_R_BD,EP_R_BF,EQ_F_BD,EQ_MD,EQ_F_BF,EQ
_MF]); 
> C:=genmatrix(Eq,[Edelta, Cost]); 
> E:=matrix(2,1,[Edelta,Cost]); 
> F_1:=multiply(C,-E); 
 
> result_3:=linsolve(A_1,F_1); 
 
> EP_F_BD:=matrix(1,1,row(result_3,3)); 
> EP_F_BD:=det(EP_F_BD); 
> EP_F_BD_Emu:=EP_F_BD-Emu; 
> delta_star:=solve(EP_F_BD_Emu,Edelta); 
>B:=matrix(10,1,[EQ_R_BD,EQ_R_BF,EP_F_BD,EP_F_BF,EP_R_BD,EP_R_BF,EQ_F_BD,EQ_MD,EQ_F_BF,EQ
_MF]); 
>EQ_R_BD:=matrix(1,1,row(result_3,1));EQ_R_BF:=matrix(1,1,row(result_3,2));EP_F_BD:=matrix(1,1,row(result_3
,3));EP_R_BD:=matrix(1,1,row(result_3,5));EP_R_BF:=matrix(1,1,row(result_3,6));EQ_F_BD:=matrix(1,1,row(result
_3,7));EQ_MD:=matrix(1,1,row(result_3,8)); 
 
For the thearetical solutions of CS and PS change. 
 
(1)  For CS change; 
 
> EP_F_BD_Emu; 
> EP_F_BD_Emu := 
collect(EP_F_BD_Emu,[Epsi,Eomiga,Egamma,Emu,EP_F_BD,EP_F_BF,epsilon32,epsilon31,eta22,eta11,sigma,epsil
on1,kappa]); 
> EQ_F_BD:=det(EQ_F_BD); 
> EQ_F_BD := 
collect(EQ_F_BD,[Epsi,Eomiga,Egamma,Emu,EP_F_BD,EP_F_BF,epsilon32,epsilon31,eta22,eta11,sigma,epsilon1,k
appa]); 
Error, (in collect) cannot collect 0 
> PS:=EP_F_BD_Emu*(1+0.5*EQ_F_BD);  
 
(2) For PS change; 
 
> EP_R_BF:=det(EP_R_BF);EQ_R_BF:=det(EQ_R_BF); 
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> EP_F_BD_0:=det(EP_F_BD);EP_R_BD_0:=det(EP_R_BD); 
>EQ_R_BD:=det(EQ_R_BD);EP_F_BD:=det(EP_F_BD);EP_R_BD:=det(EP_R_BD);EQ_F_BD; 
> P_F_BD_Q_F_BD:=24394;   P_R_BD_Q_R_BD:=51002; 
> Edelta:=0;epsilon11:=0.7; epsilon12:=10.00;    
> PS_change:=P_F_BD_Q_F_BD*(EP_F_BD-Emu)*(1+0.5*EQ_F_BD);  
> collect(PS_change,[Edelta,Cost]); 
> eta11:=-0.78; eta22:=eta11; 
> Edelta:=0; eta12:=0; eta21:=0;kappa:=a;sigma:=0.005;Cost:=0.003; 
> PS_change; 
> plot(PS_change,a=0..3,y=-100..100); 
> Edelta:=0; EP_MD:=0;EP_MF:=0; 
> eta12:=0; eta21:=0; 
> zeta_change:=2; 
> theta_change:=3; 
 
---------------COOL caused Shifter------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
> Egamma:=0.024*(1-kappa);Emu:=0.006; 
-----Parameters-------------------- 
> sigma:=0.35; Sa:=0.57;  
> epsilon11:=0.7; epsilon12:=10.00;    
> eta_own:=matrix(3,1,[-0.45,-0.78,-0.98]); 
> eta11_1:=matrix(1,1,row(eta_own,2)); 
> eta11:=det(eta11_1);eta22:=eta11; 
---cross demand elasticity----- 
> eta_cross:=matrix(5,1,[0.5,0,0.2,1,1.5]); 
> eta21_1:=matrix(1,1,row(eta_cross,2)); 
> eta21:=det(eta21_1); 
> eta12:=eta21; 
 
----Market power---- 
 
----------------------/*Oligopoly power*/------ 
> zeta_own:=matrix(4,1,[0,0.1,0.15,0.3]); 
> zeta_1:=matrix(1,1,row(zeta_own,zeta_change));zeta:=det(zeta_1); psi:=zeta/eta11; 
--------------------/*theta, relative to oligopsony power*/------ 
> theta_own:=matrix(4,1,[0,0.1,0.15,0.3]); 
> theta_1:=matrix(1,1,row(theta_own,theta_change)); theta:=det(theta_1);  omega:=theta/epsilon11; 
> kappa:=Sa*(1+omega)/(1+psi); 
> Epsi:=0; Eomiga:=0; 
 
-----------------PS & CS------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
>EQ_R_BD:=det(EQ_R_BD);EP_F_BD:=det(EP_F_BD);EP_R_BD:=det(EP_R_BD);EQ_F_BD; 
> P_F_BD_Q_F_BD:=24394;   P_R_BD_Q_R_BD:=51002; 
> PS_change:=P_F_BD_Q_F_BD*(EP_F_BD-Emu)*(1+0.5*EQ_F_BD); 
> CS_change:=-P_R_BD_Q_R_BD*((EP_R_BD-Edelta)*(1+0.5*EQ_R_BD)+(EP_R_BF-
Edelta)*(1+0.5*EQ_R_BF)); 
 
> D22:=kappa*sigma-(1-kappa)*eta22+epsilon12; 
> D11:=kappa*sigma-(1-kappa)*eta11+epsilon11; 
> DD:=D22*D11-(1-kappa)^2*eta12*eta21;restart; 
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